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Research Note 
The Hegemony of Representation:  
Democracy and Indigenous  
Self-government in Bolivia 
Jason Tockman 
Abstract: In the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the 2009 Constitution 
articulates a multidimensional conception of democracy, reflecting a 
legacy of social movement mobilizations that demanded political inclu-
sion and propelled to power a president who self-identifies as Indige-
nous. Many anticipated that Bolivia could present a propitious environ-
ment for an invigorated and post-liberal democracy. This article evalu-
ates the three dimensions of democracy enshrined in the Constitution – 
representative, participatory, and communitarian – with the aim of un-
derstanding the relationship among them. I focus on two important sites 
of democratic practice: the process of drafting and approving the Consti-
tution, and the construction of “Indigenous autonomies”; that is, institu-
tions of Indigenous self-government based on communitarian democra-
cy. While Bolivian democracy is more stable and inclusive under the 
current government than under previous ones, this study finds that the 
expansion of sanctioned participatory and communitarian democratic 
processes has been limited vis-à-vis the hegemonic system of representa-
tion. 
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Introduction 
Bolivia’s 2009 constitution articulates the combination of three dimen-
sions of democracy – representative, participatory, and communitarian – 
the coexistence of which has been characterized by Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos and others as “demodiversity” (demodiversidad). Santos and his 
collaborators emphasized that a low-intensity liberal-representative de-
mocracy has become established as globally hegemonic since the 1970s. 
The present article draws on qualitative research that has been ongoing 
since 2011 in order to assess the state of democracy and Indigenous self-
government in Bolivia since 2009.1 More broadly, I aim to understand 
the significance of the participatory and communitarian innovations 
advanced in the context of Latin America’s so-called “left turns.” I find 
that the three forms of democracy not only exist at different levels of 
government, but also overlap with one another, including within new 
territorial units of Indigenous self-government. As elaborated in the 2009 
Constitution and the country’s laws, Bolivia’s system of representation 
continues to account for most significant policy outcomes. However, 
representation is complemented by communitarian and participatory 
processes in various ways that enhance the country’s historically exclu-
sionary democracy. It is also evident that communitarian and participa-
tory democratic mechanisms are constrained by representative institu-
tions in several ways. The Bolivian narrative confirms Santos’ and his 
colleagues’ claims of the dominance of representative democracy.2  
Beyond the Constitution’s elaboration of the three forms of democ-
racy and its expansion of political space for Indigenous self-governance, 
the case of Bolivia provides important leverage to understand these po-
litical phenomena, in several ways. First, the country’s vibrant social 
movements have been highly effective in pressing their demands for 
enhanced space for participatory and communitarian democracy, which 
has shaped the current legal framework in which Indigenous rights and 
democratic participation occur and are negotiated. Second, with a majori-
ty of the population self-identifying as Indigenous, President Evo Mo-
                                                 
1  This article is based on field research conducted in Bolivian cities and majority-
Indigenous municipalities from 2011–2017; methods included semi-structured 
interviews; observation of events; and analysis of primary and secondary texts.  
2  Support for this research was provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada. Author is grateful to Maxwell Cameron for inspir-
ing and guiding this analysis of the forms of democracy, to Barbara Arneil for 
extensive and constructive feedback on an early draft of this manuscript, and to 
Karina Guzman for assistance with translation. 




rales’s Movement toward Socialism (MAS) party has adopted an in-
digenist discourse centered on plurinationalism3 and Mother Earth (pa-
chamama). Third, public debates regarding democracy, citizenship, liberal-
ism, and capitalism are commonplace, both on the streets of Bolivia and 
in its many levels of government, while the power of conservative politi-
cal parties that introduced and sustained neoliberalism has been debili-
tated. Thus, Bolivia presents an excellent study of how democracy and 
Indigenous self-government interact in what in many ways is a highly 
propitious environment for “substantial innovation in terms of devia-
tions from mainstream notions of liberal democracy” (Wolff 2013: 33). 
However, this article concludes that, far from its colorful discourse and 
symbols, the MAS’s centralization of power has in many ways con-
strained political space for the practice of participatory and communitar-
ian democracy. This conclusion illustrates that even in a relatively favor-
able setting, Indigenous rights face serious challenges in contemporary 
nation-states with colonial histories. 
Democracy and Indigenous Self-government in 
Bolivia 
The rights of Indigenous peoples and their ability to govern their own 
affairs in a given state are inseparable from the struggle for democracy. 
Indeed, Lucero observed, with regard to the Andes, “the rise of indige-
nous politics is about nothing less than the finding of a democratic route 
toward decolonization and a decolonizing route toward democracy” 
(2008: ix). Yet not every political system that might be called democratic 
is sufficiently inclusive to allow for the realization of Indigenous rights. 
On the contrary, the history of democracy, both globally and within 
Latin America, has until quite recently been a story of marginalization of 
Indigenous peoples in which gains in rights have come at the margins of 
generalized social and political exclusion. Because there is no necessary 
link between democracy and Indigenous rights, it is critical to understand 
the quality of democracy and the forms it takes in a given country. 
Diverse democratic regimes emerged across Latin America from the 
dictatorships and authoritarian regimes of the 1970s and 1980s. These 
democracies – often delegative or populist, underpinned by clientelism 
and patronage, weakly institutionalized party systems, and subject to 
periodic coups d’états – do not neatly conform to some scholars’ pre-
                                                 
3  “Plurinationalism” emphasizes the plurality of nations within a state, as op-
posed to multiplicity of cultures of “multiculturalism.” 
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scriptions or expectations of Western models of liberal democracy (e.g. 
Huntington 1991; Diamond and Morlino 2004), and are not easily cap-
tured by Eurocentric theories of democracy that assume such things as 
the separation of powers, efficient bureaucracies, civilian control of the 
military, and a privileging of the individual vote over collectivist or cor-
poratist processes. As O’Donnell argued, the assumption that there is a 
“clear and consistent corpus of democratic theory” and that these theories 
can be easily transposed from established to emerging democracies is not 
justified (2007: 2, italicized as in O’Donnell’s original text).  
Bolivia’s democratic history (1952–1964, 1982–present) squarely fits 
O’Donnell’s characterization of the “reluctant acceptance of the inclu-
sive wager” (2004: 25), and was marked by violence and exclusion until 
2006. From 1985 to 2005, a series of “democratic” administrations fre-
quently maintained order through violent repression. Elections for the 
presidency and Congress remained an elite affair of pacted agreements 
between parties that brokered systems of patronage and clientelism until 
2005. Outside of Bolivia’s official channels of power, praetorian mobili-
zation from below punctuated the exclusionary politics through repeated 
“cycles of contention” (Tarrow 1998) that increasingly challenged the 
inability of neoliberalism to respond to or incorporate those on the mar-
ginalized side of ethnic and class cleavages.  
Following the election of President Evo Morales in 2005, 61 per-
cent of Bolivian voters approved a new Constitution, supporting a novel 
political architecture that promises a more inclusive, participatory, direct, 
and representative democracy, and which extends the rights of citizen-
ship to Indigenous peoples for the first time since the founding of the 
Republic almost two centuries ago. With the guiding principle of plurina-
tionalism, the 2009 Political Constitution of the State (Constitución Polí-
tica del Estado, CPE) articulates a “participatory, representative and 
communitarian form of democracy” (Article 11). These three forms of 
democracy are conceived of as reinforcing one another by providing 
complementary routes of democratic inclusion. The Constitution created 
a path for constructing the aforementioned Indigenous autonomies – 
autonomía indígena originaria campesina (AIOC) – and established that some 
national and departmental legislators will be chosen exclusively by and 
from Indigenous communities. 
The long process of drafting the new Constitution itself signifies the 
most prominent instance of officially sanctioned participatory democracy 
in contemporary Bolivia. The popularly elected Constituent Assembly 
that led this process was a consequence of the sustained social move-
ment mobilizations from 2000–2005, led by peasants and Indigenous 




peoples, among others, who sought to fundamentally “refound” the 
state. These groups overcame long-standing divisions to form the Unity 
Pact in 2004. In August 2006, the Pact submitted a joint position for the 
refounding of the state to the Constituent Assembly in Sucre, which 
adopted much of the Unity Pact’s proposal. Thus, the Constituent As-
sembly that the Unity Pact groups had called for, and which was created 
after the election of Morales, was widely perceived as a “foundational 
political moment,” with the Constitution it drafted considered an “origi-
nary” document rather than one “derived” from the old political order 
(Garcés 2011: 47). However, the almost intractable divisions within the 
Constituent Assembly between the MAS and its allies and oppositional 
Assembly Members meant that the product of that constituent moment, 
approved in December 2007, was subjected to a series of revisions by 
the Congress. Those modifications, which involved more than 100 arti-
cles, were the product of negotiations between the MAS and conserva-
tive opposition lawmakers – remnants of the old political order (Centel-
las 2013). Consequently, the revised text, finalized in October 2008, was 
a negotiated, “derivative” text that emerged from “already constituted 
powers rather than those rising up through social mobilization” (Garcés 
2011: 47).  
Some have noted that the compromises made at the final stage of 
negotiation were crucial in resolving the political impasse. By securing 
input from the opposition, the MAS was able to mollify conservative 
opposition to the CPE enough to submit it to public referendum (M. 
Cameron 2010). Others have argued that the Congress’s metiendo mano 
(sticking their hands into) fundamentally disarticulated the constitutive 
nature of the text (Garcés 2011). Santos observes that:  
the constituent process, as it advanced, was changing the power 
relations in favor of the conservative opposition, which was only 
unable to claim the approval of the final text as a victory due to its 
political myopia. (Santos 2010: 78, translation by author)  
The revised text prohibited Indigenous seats in the national legislature 
from crossing departmental boundaries, and restricted them to rural 
areas where Indigenous people are a minority (Article 146); removed 
language that would preclude the “ordinary” system of justice from re-
viewing decisions arising through communitarian justice (originally in 
Article 192); and made non-retroactive new spatial limits (5,000 hectares) 
on large agricultural land holdings (Article 399) (Garcés 2011).  
Through the congressional intervention into the product of the 
Constituent Assembly’s deliberations, we see that numerous features of 
the constituted political order were sustained. The legislature’s modifica-
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tions of the Assembly’s work highlight the interplay of the various forms 
of democracy in two respects. Firstly, in both the Assembly’s process 
and product, there has been a combination of institutional influences 
toward the production of a hybrid text that emphasizes representative, 
participatory, and communitarian processes. Secondly, considering that it 
was the Congress that left the final imprint on the CPE, this particular 
expression of demodiversity is colored by a distinctly representative tint.  
Consequently, even as the negotiated constitutional text opens new 
communitarian spaces for Indigenous self-government, it also funda-
mentally constrains it. The Constitution reserves control of non-renew-
able natural resources to the central government, including where such 
resources underlie Indigenous territory: “The natural resources are the 
property and direct domain, indivisible and without limitation, of the 
Bolivian people, and their administration corresponds to the State on 
behalf of the collective interest” (Article 349). With regard to the im-
portant natural gas sector, Article 359 adds that: “The State, on behalf of 
and in representation of the Bolivian people, is owner of the entire coun-
try’s hydrocarbon production.”  
The central government’s indisputable control of natural resources 
is not accidental. In December 2011, as Morales officially received the 
first completed statute of Indigenous autonomy (that of the Uru peoples 
of Chipaya), the president clarified that, contrary to the claims of some 
local agents, Articles 349 and 359 apply to all Bolivian territory – includ-
ing the new Indigenous autonomies:  
In the Constitution, it says that natural resources belong to the 
Bolivian people under the administration of the Plurinational 
State. In some regions, [people] are trying to generate confusion 
[…] some of our brothers say that, because they have Indigenous 
first peoples autonomy they are entitled to the natural resources. 
[These], especially the hydrocarbons, metal and non-metal [miner-
al] resources, belong to the national government. (Los Tiempos 
2011)  
Morales’s interpretation highlights how, despite the country’s discursive 
conversion into a “plurinational state,” political practice frequently sus-
tains a republicanism that prioritizes the universal over the particular.4  
  
                                                 
4  In developing this analysis, I am grateful for suggestions by Barbara Arneil, 
who reviewed an earlier draft of this article. 




Indigenous Institutions of Self-government in 
Bolivia 
As the 2009 Constitution ushered in a novel legal framework, it had 
various significant effects on Indigenous self-governance and official 
spaces for communitarian democracy. The CPE substantially altered 
Bolivia’s territorial organization and government institutions, structuring 
them anew around a series of “territorial entities”: a central government 
based in La Paz, nine departments, 112 sub-departmental provinces, and 
327 municipalities, which typically include an urban center and the sur-
rounding rural areas.5 Indigenous autonomies can be created through the 
conversion of other territories, and represent a fifth type of territorial 
entity. All of these territorial entities except provinces are considered 
“autonomous” zones of governance with constitutionally defined “com-
petencies” in a non-hierarchical rubric.  
Virtually every part of the Bolivian state has been modified by the 
Constitution in ways relevant to Indigenous peoples, including all the 
organs of the national government, many ministries and agencies (includ-
ing the creation of the Ministry of Autonomies, which was demoted to a 
Vice Ministry in January 2017), and all levels of government, from na-
tional to departmental to municipal level. Nationally, the principal insti-
tutions of government have been reorganized as “organs” that are con-
ceived as functioning together holistically within the unitary state. In the 
bicameral Plurinational Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa 
Plurinacional – ALP), which replaced the former Congress, “special 
Indigenous first peoples peasant seats” are established in rural zones in 
those departments where they constitute a minority (Article 146.VII).  
Since 2009, the ALP has approved numerous laws required to im-
plement the new order, several of which apply directly to Indigenous 
rights. Many of these new laws have progressively constrained the provi-
sions of the Constitution that had expanded spaces for Indigenous self-
government and communitarian democracy. One representative of the 
Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (Confederación de 
Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia – CIDOB) explained that, with approval of 
the Constitution, CIDOB had “achieved our demand, or proposal, what 
we wanted […] that was fulfilled. And henceforth, we have had many 
problems.”6 Salgado Moreno described these developments as “a regres-
sion or notable brake that returns Indigenous peoples to almost the same 
                                                 
5  As of July 2017, there are 337 municipalities. 
6  From interview in Santa Cruz, 5 March 2012.  
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level of progress as before the approval of the 2009 Constitution” (2011: 
226). A notable example is the 2010 Electoral Regime Law, which speci-
fies that only seven of the ALP’s 130 deputies will be “selected” by In-
digenous peoples, one from each of the country’s nine departments 
except Chuquisaca and Potosí (Article 57.I).7 This was immediately criti-
cized by Indigenous groups, which have pointed out that the selection 
process is not consistent with Indigenous norms, and that the number of 
allocated seats is not sufficiently representative.  
Many of the most significant changes to Bolivia’s democratic insti-
tutions that relate to Indigenous peoples have occurred at the local level. 
Indigenous autonomies are constitutionally endowed with a broad range 
of authorities, including elaborating development strategies and land 
management plans, levying taxes, exercising communitarian justice, and 
managing renewable natural resources. Approximately three dozen mu-
nicipalities and Indigenous territories (territorios indígenas originarios campes-
inos – TIOCs) are at some stage of converting to Indigenous autonomy, 
at the center of which is the process of elaborating autonomy statutes – 
codified local rules that will govern the new territorial units.  
External agents have played significant roles in the elaboration of 
Indigenous autonomy in the pilot AIOCs. Principal among these agents 
were the central government, its contracted consultants (técnicos), political 
parties (most significantly the MAS), and non-governmental organiza-
tions. The roles of these agencies and groups are multifaceted and can-
not be caricatured simply as constructive accompaniment or subversive 
cooptation. However, this participation has had real effects in that it has 
ensured that the incipient AIOCs embed themselves in the country’s 
legal framework and reinforce the central goals of the unitary state.  
The fact that AIOCs exist at all is a product of the central govern-
ment’s past support for Indigenous self-government, especially up to and 
including the drafting of the 2009 Constitution. Yet, since that time, the 
MAS government has progressively become ambivalent toward Indige-
nous autonomy, acting as much to limit these spaces as to support them. 
Beyond the Ministry of Autonomies, a general lack of state support for 
the construction of Indigenous autonomy is evident in the government’s 
meager provision of financial resources to execute AIOC conversion, the 
delayed commencement of the process for TIOCs, and the numerous 
and complex bureaucratic requirements that communities must fulfill to 
transition to Indigenous autonomy. These factors led one spokesperson 
                                                 
7  All Indigenous people in a given department are merged into an aggregated 
circumscription.  




of the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu 
(CONAMAQ) to allege that the central government lacks the “political 
will to support the theme of Indigenous autonomy.”8 Similarly, an Indig-
enous representative from Salinas de Garcí Mendoza commented, 
“There has not been progress on the theme of the AIOC; it places new 
requirements and conditions. It is not self-determination.”9  
The central government and MAS’s ambivalence toward Indigenous 
autonomy has been on display during many of President Morales’s pub-
lic appearances around Indigenous autonomy. In Charagua, when Mo-
rales was the featured speaker at a 2009 campaign rally as the municipali-
ty prepared to vote on Indigenous autonomy, the president did not ex-
plicitly refer to the referendum or encourage those in attendance to vote 
for it (Albó 2012). At a May 2012 event in Mojocoya during which Mo-
rales formally received the municipality’s statute, he again did not 
acknowledge Indigenous autonomy.10 And when he received Chipaya’s 
approved statute in 2011, Morales took the opportunity to warn that the 
conversion to Indigenous autonomy does not provide Indigenous peo-
ples with control of natural resources. These omissions and assertions 
suggest that for Morales, Indigenous autonomy is at best a low priority, 
and at worst a problematic initiative that needs to be carefully controlled. 
Where the central government has been actively involved in AIOC 
processes, it has both helped and hindered them. In Mojocoya, Tarabu-
co, and Charagua, técnicos intervened extensively in the meetings of au-
tonomous assemblies. Their counsel was not always limited to the neu-
tral, technical advice that many would hope for in putatively autonomous 
and deliberative processes. However, the impact that técnicos have had has 
been less a matter of inserting substantive content into the statutes than 
the continuous influence of a legalistic logic that seems to have circum-
scribed the scope of what local agents perceive Indigenous autonomy to 
be. As John Cameron observed, “Indigenous peoples have adapted their 
supposedly ‘autonomous’ community-based modes of decision-making 
to fit into the political opportunities created by the state,” and in doing 
so, “they have also become increasingly circumscribed into the manage-
rial logic of the Bolivian state” (J. Cameron 2010: 12).  
The MAS birthed a new political era for Indigenous self-govern-
ment, marked by both disjuncture and continuity; however, since 2009 
                                                 
8  From interview on 6 November 2013. 
9  From field notes by John Cameron, Ministry of Autonomies meeting, 25 April 
2013 (author’s translation). 
10  From personal communication with Pere Morell i Torra, 25 May 2012, author’s 
translation. 
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there has been a discernible shift in the MAS’s legislative and executive 
leadership to a more critical approach to Indigenous rights. This evolu-
tion is principally a consequence of the changing nature of the MAS as it 
has moved from the opposition to an elected government. When in the 
opposition, Morales and the MAS were one component of the social 
movement mobilizations against the country’s neoliberal program. The 
MAS, a self-described “political instrument” of diverse and sometimes 
incongruous social movements, assembled a broad coalition of progres-
sive sectors and pledged to include Indigenous peoples politically. Since 
taking office, Morales and the MAS have contended with different pres-
sures: governing in Bolivia’s complex landscape of social and political 
forces, and grappling with a position in the global economy that makes it 
difficult to chart an economic program not based on the extraction of 
natural resources. The MAS has encountered the electoral imperatives of 
being a government that wants to retain power in a diverse and conflic-
tive political terrain, and has therefore sought to centralize power and 
corral social forces within the party (Anria 2010). Concomitantly, it has 
attempted to address poverty reduction and economic growth through a 
program of resource nationalism. This programmatic orientation has 
sometimes conflicted with Indigenous peoples’ demands for greater 
territorial control; this has meant, since 2009, a growing official ambiva-
lence toward a program of Indigenous autonomy – and communitarian 
democracy more broadly. In practice, communitarian democracy exists 
locally, while representation – by means of elected executives and legisla-
tors – continues to account for most national, regional, and even local 
economic and social policies. These observations support the claims of 
Santos and his colleagues regarding the contemporary dominance of 
representative democracy.  
However, since 2010 a new round of mobilizations have proliferat-
ed across Bolivia – frequently in relation to the government’s natural 
resource policies. Expressing participatory forms of democracy that take 
place outside of official institutions, these marches, protests, blockades, 
and strikes have often included Indigenous peoples. Numerous social 
sectors united during the 2011 Gasolinazo protests to force the govern-
ment to abandon policies that increased gas and diesel prices. Indigenous 
peoples have mobilized to demand greater territorial control, most sig-
nificantly in the case of the proposed highway through the Isiboro 
Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS), home to 
Yuracaré, Tsimane, and Mojeño Trinitario Indigenous peoples. In re-
sponse to the government’s draft Mining Law, Ley #535, confrontations 
erupted when cooperativist miners blocked roads in 2014, resulting in 




two deaths, more than 100 injuries, and the reported taking of 43 police 
officers as hostages (Dangl 2014). Hundreds of Bolivian soldiers went on 
strike and marched through La Paz, demanding “decolonization” of the 
armed forces, which they criticized for the lack of career advancement, 
especially for low-ranking soldiers of poor and Indigenous backgrounds 
(Página Siete 2014). A series of regional and sectoral mobilizations have 
also given voice to a range of other grievances: residents of El Alto de-
manding expedition of the census, those of Potosí demanding develop-
ment projects, many communities insisting on resolution of municipal 
boundary disputes, and labor groups demanding policy changes and 
better wages. To a significant degree, a grassroots and participatory poli-
tics of protest in the streets has been a dominant feature of contempo-
rary Bolivian democracy. 
Forms of Democracy 
The contemporary discourse and practice of Bolivian politics provide a 
useful vantage point to examine the possibilities and limits of the distinct 
dimensions of democracy. Many scholars have paid particular attention 
to the quality and diversity of democratic regimes, based on multiple 
standards of assessment (O’Donnell, Vargas Cullell, and Iazzetta 2004; 
Diamond and Morlino 2004; O’Donnell 2007). O’Donnell and his coau-
thors (2004) proposed a shift toward thinking about the “quality of de-
mocracy” or “democraticness” as a concept that incorporates not just 
the political regime, but also criteria such as institutional performance, 
the character of political life, and the aspirations of a country’s citizens. 
Other observers of Latin American democracy have conceptualized 
democracy as having multiple dimensions, conceiving of representative, 
participatory, and communitarian forms of democracy that coexist ami-
cably and/or contradictorily (Santos and Avritzer 2005; Santos 2010; 
Seele and Peruzzotti 2009; Cameron, Hershberg, and Sharpe 2012; Exeni 
2012).  
What must “rule of the people” mean if it is to include Indigenous 
peoples? An inclusive democracy must not only exceed elections and 
extend to certain rights and freedoms, but those rights and freedoms 
must apply both to individuals and groups. Indigenous peoples, in con-
trast to Indigenous people (individuals), are collective political subjects 
whose right to participate and be represented cannot be contained within 
strictly liberal strategies that serially aggregate the rational preferences of 
putatively autonomous individuals. Though marked by great variation, 
the norms and procedures of Indigenous peoples – which are drawn 
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from but are probably rarely identical to pre-colonial processes and 
structures – generally involve collective decision-making that occurs in 
ways that look very different from voting by secret ballot. Under systems 
of communitarian democracy,11 decisions are often arrived at and au-
thorities are often selected through deliberative assemblies where partici-
pation is neither universal nor secret. In the selection of authorities, a 
common practice among Andean Indigenous peoples is to form a queue 
behind candidates, each of whom has already fulfilled a series of posi-
tions within the community; the candidate with the longest line behind 
him or her is chosen for the position of authority. Decisions are often 
made by consensus of those attending assemblies. At these meetings, it is 
common for a married person, usually male, to represent the family unit 
in what is conceived of as gender complementarity. If we are to conceive 
of democracy as something that includes inhabitants that are Indigenous, 
and does not obligate them to abandon their political and cultural prac-
tices in order to be political subjects, then democracy needs to recognize 
and accept such group processes. This requires us to think beyond the 
suppositions of liberal democracy. “Thinking beyond” does not mean 
that democracy abandons liberalism, but that liberal processes alone 
cannot encompass Indigenous political norms.  
Numerous scholars have studied participatory forms of democracy 
that occur within state institutions, such as referenda, recall, citizens’ 
initiatives, community councils, and participatory budgeting (Selee and 
Peruzzotti 2009; Cameron, Hershberg, and Sharpe 2012), but participa-
tion also occurs outside of official institutions and perhaps even in open 
opposition to them, including petitions, demonstrations, strikes, and 
other forms of grassroots mobilization. While officially sanctioned spac-
es often provide avenues by which historically excluded groups may 
participate in ways that enhance democratic goals (namely, inclusion, 
representation, and accountability), it is also apparent that these seeming-
ly constituent processes can be perverted, including the clientelistic am-
bitions to build support for the administration implementing these insti-
tutions (Santos and Avritzer 2005). Indeed, participatory gestures may be 
conceived of by policy makers as a means to abdicate state functions, 
devolving responsibilities and expenditures to civil society (Cameron, 
Hershberg, and Sharpe 2012). However, Selee and Peruzzotti (2009) 
emphasized that participatory institutions are unlike Latin America’s 
                                                 
11  The term “communitarian democracy,” as employed here, refers to Indigenous 
political institutions and processes, and is not intended to connect with broad-
er, often normative philosophical debates over communitarianism (e.g. Mac-
Intyre 1981). 




conventional response – populism – which seeks to bypass representa-
tion by directly linking the leader to “the people”. In contrast, participa-
tory democratic institutions complement and can enhance representative 
ones.  
Although Bolivia’s new institutions of Indigenous self-government 
can be fairly characterized as participatory, they also entail distinct struc-
tures and processes that cannot be wholly contained within that dimen-
sion of democracy. Some practices of communitarian democracy vary 
from one nation to another, and even sometimes from one territorial 
unit (for example, an Aymara marka or Guaraní capitanía) to another, 
adjacent one. That said, numerous communitarian practices are signifi-
cantly generalized across Quechua and Aymara communities, including 
norms of gender complementarity, chachawarmi, through which positions 
of authority, cargos, are held by married couples, although in most cases 
with the man as the primary authority figure; and the rotational holding 
of positions, or muyu. These communitarian processes are distinct from 
representative and participatory modes of democracy (as well as delibera-
tive, liberal, and republican ones) in that they are based on Indigenous 
practices that do not adhere to the standards of other forms of democra-
cy, such as the centrality of the autonomous, rational individual and the 
universal secret vote of liberal democracy. 
As noted above, the coexistence of representative, participatory and 
communitarian forms of democracy has been conceived of as demodi-
versity by Santos and Avritzer (2005), and the term has been taken up by 
numerous scholars of Latin American democracy (e.g. Exeni 2012). De-
modiversity, as these scholars have conceived it, is based on two obser-
vations: (1) there are multiple forms of democracy, and (2) the “hege-
monic” liberal-representative model of democracy does not necessarily 
ensure more than a “low intensity democracy” (Exeni 2012). Santos and 
Avritzer (2005) claimed that the global ascent of liberal democracy since 
the 1970s has led to a decline in demodiversity. The low-intensity liberal 
democracy they decry is globally hegemonic due to its compatibility with 
the social inequality of neoliberal globalization. This is because the rise of 
that brand of capitalism held the economic realm to be beyond demo-
cratic considerations, and because political accountability has been lim-
ited to voting (Santos and Avritzer 2005: lxv). 
The question to which these literatures point is whether the varying 
democratic forms reinforce or undermine one another. My response is 
that while new institutions of communitarian and participatory democra-
cy can certainly complement and even enhance the practice of repre-
sentative democracy, there remains in Bolivia a clear hierarchy of repre-
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sentative over communitarian and participatory processes, impairing the 
practice of the latter two. 
Conclusion 
This article’s findings contribute to an understanding of the coexistence 
of representative, participatory, and communitarian dimensions of de-
mocracy, as Bolivian politics express demodiversity in various and com-
plex ways. In terms of representation, legislators and executives are 
elected at the state’s various levels. Participation occurs through the 
occasional recall or referenda held, in the Constituent Assembly process 
of 2006–2007, and in the frequent strikes, protests, and marches that 
flare across the country. Communitarian democracy is practiced at the 
level of the community and within the incipient Indigenous autonomies. 
However, this demodiversity does not entail a simple delegation of di-
mensions of democracy to distinct levels of government (that is, repre-
sentation nationally, communitarian locally). Elections and representa-
tion occur at every level, including municipally; the system of justice 
incorporates communitarian processes and structures alongside the “or-
dinary” ones; and seven legislative seats are chosen exclusively by Indig-
enous people. Demodiversity is expressed within the AIOCs themselves, 
with deliberative assembles coexisting with executive and legislative bod-
ies, and secret balloting taking place in tandem with consensus-based 
processes. However, this article finds that the MAS has prioritized repre-
sentative democracy at the expense of participatory and communitarian 
forms of democracy. 
This investigation is instructive for comprehending the significance 
of the participatory and communitarian innovations of Latin America’s 
so-called “left turns.” Latin American accounts of the diverse forms of 
democracy have suggested that these dimensions of democracy can be 
complementary and mutually reinforcing (Lissidini 2012; Pogrebinschi 
2012). The present study supports the complementarity between dimen-
sions of democracy; this is illustrated by the presence of circumscriptions 
that are elected by Indigenous peoples in the national and departmental 
legislatures, and the communitarian democracy unfolding in AIOC con-
struction. The latter provides Indigenous agents with new political ave-
nues that, by all accounts, augment rather than conflict with Bolivia’s 
system of representation.  
However, communitarian and participatory democracy have faced 
numerous obstacles, especially when they have sought expression be-
yond the local level. In the drafting of the new Constitution, we observe 




the contentious interplay of representative and participatory democratic 
forms, with the modification of the Constituent Assembly’s work by a 
subset of the formerly elected Congress, which left a significant and final 
imprint and ensured that the 2009 Constitution would give greater em-
phasis to representation. Consequently, representation continues to ac-
count for most policy outcomes. Candidacy for the legislature’s Indige-
nous circumscriptions is frequently mediated by political parties, and the 
number of seats has been limited to seven out of 130. In the judicial 
realm, primacy is given to the “ordinary” system of justice, with commu-
nitarian justice relegated to relatively minor crimes and conflicts. In the 
construction of Indigenous autonomy, communitarian democracy is 
constrained by the system of representation, due in part to the MAS’s 
efforts to maintain influence at the local level, including by running its 
own candidates against those chosen through local assemblies according 
to Indigenous norms. Access to Indigenous autonomy, by which com-
munitarian democracy can be enhanced, faces numerous obstacles. Con-
sequently, as of July 2017 – seven and a half years since the AIOC pro-
cesses commenced – Charagua, Chipaya, and Raqaypampa remain the 
only Indigenous communities to have navigated the entire process and 
converted to Indigenous autonomy. Meanwhile, residents of Totora and 
Mojocoya overwhelmingly voted their statutes down. 
All of these observations support Santos and Avritzer’s claim of the 
dominance of representative democracy, and suggest that despite the 
compatibility of dimensions of democracy, tensions and resistance may 
materialize where communitarian and participatory democratic mecha-
nisms are being implemented. Thus, while new institutions of communi-
tarian and participatory democracy complement and enhance practices of 
representation, we see in Bolivia that a clear hierarchy of representative 
over communitarian and participatory forms continues, to the detriment 
of the latter dimensions.  
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La Hegemonía de Representación: Democracia y Autogobierno 
Indígena en Bolivia Contemporáneo 
Resumen: En el Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, la Constitución de 
2009 articula una concepción multidimensional de democracia, reflejan-
do un legado de movilizaciones de movimientos sociales que demanda-
ban inclusión política y propulsaron al poder a un presidente que se 
auto-identifica como indígena. Muchos anticiparon que Bolivia podía 
presentar un ambiente propicio para una democracia vigorizada y post-
liberal. Este artículo evalúa las tres dimensiones de la democracia consa-
gradas en la Constitución – representativa, participativa y comunitaria – 
con el objetivo de entender la relación entre ellas. Me concentro en dos 
sitios importantes de práctica democrática: el proceso de elaboración y 
aprobación de la Constitución, y la construcción de las “autonomías 
indígenas”; es decir, las instituciones de autogobierno indígena basadas 
en la democracia comunitaria. Mientras la democracia boliviana es más 
estable e inclusiva bajo el actual gobierno que bajo los gobiernos previos, 
este estudio encuentra que la expansión de procesos democráticos parti-
cipativos y comunitarios sancionados ha sido limitada frente al sistema 
hegemónico de representación. 
Palabras clave: Bolivia, derechos indígenas, democracia, representación 
